Intrinsic motivations and open-ended learning by Baldassarre, Gianluca
Intrinsic Motivations and 
Open-ended Learning 
Gianluca Baldassarre 
Laboratory of Computational Embodied Neuroscience, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della 
Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (LOCEN-ISTC-CNR), 
Via San Martino della Battaglia 44, I-00185 Roma, Italy 
gianluca.baldassarre@istc.cnr.it 
 
Abstract 
There is a growing interest and literature on intrinsic motivations and open-ended learning in both               
cognitive robotics and machine learning on one side, and in psychology and neuroscience on the               
other. This paper aims to review some relevant contributions from the two literature threads and to                
draw links between them. To this purpose, the paper starts by defining intrinsic motivations and by                
presenting a computationally-driven theoretical taxonomy of their different types. Then it presents            
relevant contributions from the psychological and neuroscientific literature related to intrinsic           
motivations, interpreting them based on the grid, and elucidates the mechanisms and functions they              
play in animals and humans. Endowed with such concepts and their biological underpinnings, the              
paper next presents a selection of models from cognitive robotics and machine learning that              
computationally operationalise the concepts of intrinsic motivations and links them to biology            
concepts. The contribution finally presents some of the open challenges of the field from both the                
psychological/neuroscientific and computational perspectives. 
Introduction 
There is wide and growing literature on ​intrinsic motivations ​(IMs) from both the biological perspective,               
involving in particular psychology and neuroscience, and the computational perspective, involving           
cognitive robotics and machine learning. The objective of this paper is to review some contributions               
from these two threads of the literature and to draw links between them. The research carried out                 
within the two perspectives is often carried out in parallel, with limited cross talk between the two. A                  
more intense dialogue between the two could lead to benefit both. On one side, the biological                
research might benefit of operational concepts and models of IMs from the computational perspective              
to produce quantitative detailed predictions to test in experiments. On the other side, computational              
research might benefit of high-level insights on the general principles behind natural IM systems that               
might suggest new ways to structure the architecture of artificial IM systems, and that might suggest                
new classes of algorithms accomplishing useful computational functions within open-ended learning.           
Open-ended learning refers to robots and agents that, similarly to the early development of humans               
(Weng et al. 2001, Lungarella et al. 2003), undergo prolonged periods of learning where they               
autonomously acquire knowledge and skills that might be useful to later solve extrinsic tasks given by                
the user (Baldassarre and Mirolli 2013; Doncieux et al. 2018).  
 
The paper is organised as follows. First it gives a computationally-driven theoretical grid of the               
concepts, in particular by defining IMs by contrasting them with ​extrinsic motivations ​(EMs), and then               
by giving a classification of different IMs based on the mechanisms they rely on and the typical                 
 
 
cognitive functions they might serve, in particular by referring to three main classes of IMs called here                 
epistemic intrinsic motivations ​(eIM). This grid is then used to draw the links between the biological                
and computational perspectives. Second, it presents some relevant psychological and neuroscientific           
literature to exemplify possible behavioural functions of the different classes of eIMs, and the possible               
neural mechanisms underlying them. Third, it presents a selection of contributions from cognitive             
robotics and machine learning that exploit IMs, both eIMs and other IMs, to face computationally               
relevant problems; this also allows the computational operationalisation of the biological concepts on             
IMs thus drawing the seeked links between the biological and computational perspectives on them.              
The work concludes by presenting some of the open challenges of the research on IMs within the two                  
perspectives. 
A conceptual grid: extrinsic and intrinsic motivations       
mechanisms and functions, and classes of (epistemic)       
intrinsic motivations 
The concept of IM has been proposed and developed within the psychological literature to overcome               
the difficulties of the behaviourist theory on learning and drives (e.g., Skinner, 1938; Hull, 1943), in                
particular to explain why animals spontaneously engage in puzzles (Harlow, 1950) or can be              
instrumentally conditioned to produce particular responses on the basis of apparently neutral stimuli             
(e.g., a sudden light onset; Kish, 1955) as it happens with “standard” primary rewards (e.g., food).                
Subsequent proposals highlighted how the properties of certain ​stimuli ​can indeed trigger animal             
exploration and guide their learning processes, for example when the stimuli are complex,             
unexpected, or in general ``surprising'' (Berlyne, 1966). Another important thread of psychological            
research highlighted the importance that ​action plays in IMs, for example in relation to the fact that an                  
agent manages to affect the environment with its behaviour (​effectance​; White, 1959), or can              
autonomously set own ​goals ​and master their achievement (Ryan, 2000). 
 
Within the computational sciences, Schmidhuber (1991) firstly presented a computational          
operationalisation of some IM mechanisms (in particular ​prediction-based IMs​, see below), and Barto             
et al. (2004), settled the fundamental link between IMs (in particular ​competence-based IMs​, see              
below) and ​reinforcement learning ​(RL) methods (Sutton and Barto 2018). These ideas were first              
developed within the Developmental Robotics scientific community (with works in the journal “IEEE             
TAMD” and the conferences “ICDL” and “EpiRob”; Zlatev and Balkenius 2001, Lungarella et al. 2003,               
Oudeyer et al. 2007b, Schembri et al. 2007, Doya and Taniguchi 2019), and lately were developed                
within the autonomous/cognitive robotics and machine learning community (e.g., Bellemare, 2016;           
Nair et al. 2018), in particular driven by the success of deep neural networks and RL (Goodfellow et                  
al. 2017; Sutton and Barto 2018).  
 
Now the concepts used here are presented more in detail. These concepts will support the discussion                
of representative contributions from the biological and computational perspectives and the illustration            
of the links between them. The concepts of this grid often refer to the two key points of view from                    
which one can look at cognition elements and computational models, namely (Tinbergen, 1963; Marr              
and Poggio, 1976): (b) the ​computational functions they serve, i.e. the ​problems they solve: the               
functions indicate the possible “uses” for which they might be employed within an overall              
cognitive/robotic system; (a) the ​mechanisms, ​or ​algorithms, ​used to accomplish those functions: the             
 
 
mechanisms refer to brain operations or the algorithms that are used as a means to actually                
accomplish the functions. Some specifications are due in relation to the use of the terms “functions”                
and “mechanisms” done here. First, for animals “function” is referred to ​adaptive function​, i.e. the               
utility of certain elements of intelligence, such as an IM, for the animal ​biological fitness​. For robots,                 
“function” is referred to the utility of a certain element of the robot’s intelligence for the robot’s ​user​.                  
Second, as the functions of a computer program, “functions” can be organised at multiple hierarchical               
levels: from the highest level just mentioned (“biological fitness”; “utility for the user”), to lower levels,                
for example “producing movements to change the world as desired”, “memorising precepts”,            
“anticipating future percepts”, etc.; each of these functions can be further decomposed into even              
lower-level functions, for example “changing the world” might require to “recognise the current state of               
the world”, “anticipate a desired state of the world (goal)”, and “performing an action to lead the world                  
from the current to the desired state”. Thus, a function can be seen as realised through a mechanism,                  
but this mechanism in turn can be seen as a function to be realised, and as such it can be solved by                      
lower-level mechanisms: this downward decomposition can continue until mechanisms that are           
(arbitrarily) considered as primitive for a given analysis. For this reason, here the term “mechanism” is                
used to mean the lowest and most specific level of the hierarchy of the considered functions,                
considerable as primitive for the given purposes.  
Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
What are ​motivations​? Motivations are an element of intelligence having at least three important              
functions (for organisms, cf. Panksepp 1998): (a) ​selection​: drive the system to select a behaviour,               
among alternative available ones, to attend the most important current needs/goals; (b) ​energy​:             
establish the amount of energy invested in executing the selected behaviour; (c) ​learning​: generate              
learning signals to change behaviour. This paper considers in particular the first and third function of                
motivation. For example, we will see how IMs can drive an agent to move to some areas of the                   
environment in navigation tasks (behaviour selection), or can produce the reward signals for             
reinforcement learning processes (production of learning signals).  
 
What are ​intrinsic motivations​? When initially studied in psychology, IMs were defined as motivations              
driving the performance of behaviour “for its own sake”, i.e. without any direct apparent purpose               
(Berlyne 1966). Although useful to guide intuition, this definition does not clarify the functions, nor the                
mechanisms, of IMs. A more operational definition proposed here is that ​intrinsic motivations are              
processes that can drive the acquisition of knowledge and skills in the absence of extrinsic               
motivations​. IMs are hence best understood by contrasting them to ​extrinsic motivations ​(EMs). Table              
1 highlights the main differences between EM and a very important subset of IMs that are called here                  
epistemic intrinsic motivations (eMSs). ​In Baldassarre (2011) EIM were considered to be IMs ​tout              
court​, but here it is recognised that they do not cover the full spectrum of IMs because, as we shall                    
see, there are some IMs that are not eIMs. In the table, EMs are however contrasted to eIMs because                   
these form the bulk of IMs and because for their distinctive features they can help to clarify the overall                   
nature of the whole set of IMs with respect to EMs. 
 
Regarding functions, EMs have the overall function of driving behaviour and learning to the ​acquisition               
of material resources​. For example, the EM of “hunger” drives behaviour to look for and ingest food,                 
and when this happens the behaviour leading to it is strengthened. Instead, IMs have the overall                
function of driving behaviour and learning towards the ​acquisition of knowledge and skills ​(knowledge              
also encompasses skills, but these are mentioned explicitly to emphasize the aspects of knowledge              
 
 
more directly linked to action). For example, an IM related to novelty seeking could drive an agent to                  
explore a novel object. In this respect, IMs have an ​epistemic function​. This function is shared by ​all                  
IMs, not only by eIMs, as ​all IMs support the acquisition of knowledge and skills: in other words, all                   
IMs have an epistemic function. In this respect, the term “epistemic motivations” might have been               
used in place of the term IMs, misleading as “intrinsic” suggests “internal” or at best -and stretching it-                  
to “not directed to external material resources”, but the term IMs is kept for its tradition. Moreover, the                  
term eIMs is handy to refer to IMs that, as shown below, are also based on an “epistemic mechanism”                   
whereas non-epistemic IMs do not do so. In this respect, eIMs are the most prototypical IMs and a                  
term referring only to them is useful. 
 
Table 1​: Main features of extrinsic and (epistemic) intrinsic motivations. 
 Extrinsic motivations (EMs) (Epistemic) Intrinsic motivations 
(eIMs) 
Function Organisms: acquisition of ​material 
resources​. 
Robots: accomplishment of ​user’s 
goals​. 
Acquisition of ​knowledge and 
skills​. 
Mechanism Organisms: measure the acquisition 
of ​material resources​ by getting 
information ​on their levels/changes 
from​ ​body​ and ​resource monitoring​. 
Robots: measure the level/change of 
accomplishment of the user’s goals. 
Measure the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills by getting 
information ​on their levels/changes 
in ​other parts of the  brain 
(organisms) ​or​ controller (robots)​. 
Time of contribution 
to the function 
Immediately​: when the material 
resource are achieved and used 
(organisms); when the user’s goals 
are accomplished (robots).  
Later​: when the acquired 
knowledge and skills are used to 
acquire resources (organisms) or 
to accomplish the user’s goals 
(robots). 
“Time signature” of 
the motivation 
They tend to ​go away​ when the 
related resources are acquired, and 
to ​come back​ when they lack. 
They tend to ​go away for good 
when the related pieces of 
knowledge/skills are acquired. 
 
In terms of ​mechanisms​, in animals EMs are based on measures of the acquisition of material                
resources by getting information on their levels/changes ​in the body ​or ​in the environment​. For               
example, hunger (a drive guiding the selection of behaviours related to food seeking) might be               
triggered when the blood glucose levels are low; and a reward signal (a learning signal) might be                 
produced when food is ingested. Alternatively, an EM might be related to monitoring the              
presence/absence of resources externally to the body, for example the presence of a mating              
companion or the smell of prey in the environment (Baldassarre 2011). In robots, EMs are based on                 
the measure of the accomplishment of the user’s goals. Here the terms “extrinsic tasks/goals” will thus                
be referred to tasks/goals involving the accomplishment of material resources or user’s goals.             
Incidentally, notice how EMs are a direct derivation of evolution: in animals, the acquisition of material                
resources is a means to increase biological fitness (number of fertile offspring), and more specifically               
the means for it, i.e. survival and reproduction; similarly in robots, the successful accomplishment of               
the user’s goals produces a higher chance that the specific features of the robot controller and                
physical structure are “reproduced”, as they are or in variants, in future robots. 
 
 
 
Instead, eIMs rely on mechanisms that measure knowledge and skills by getting information on their               
levels/changes ​in other parts of the brain ​(for organisms) or ​in controller (for robots). Importantly, note                
how this implies that an eIM involves the presence of at least three structures and functions inside the                  
brain/controller: (a) a “​source-component” that acquires knowledge; (b) an ​IM-mechanism ​that           
receives in input information on the level or change of the knowledge of source-component; (c) a                
“​target-component​” that receives the output of the IM-mechanism and uses it to select             
behaviour/energise behaviour/drive learning processes. The core of the whole eIM process is the IM              
mechanism that measures the level or change of knowledge of the source-component. 
 
The specification above is very important as conceptually eIMs involve the learning processes and              
knowledge to ​two ​different cognitive/computational components that might be very different in terms of              
mechanisms and functions they play within the overall system, and this might make difficult to               
recognise them in organisms or to implement them in robots. In some cases (Figure 1), the                
source-component and the target-component are the same data structure, in the sense that the              
IM-mechanism detects the knowledge level/change in a component with the function of affecting the              
learning of the same component (possibly with the mediation of other components). For example, the               
hippocampus might detect the novelty of an item and this might favour the memorisation of the item                 
by the hippocampus itself (Lisman and Grace 2005). As another example, from robotics (Santucci et               
al. 2016), the selection of the skill to train among many skills to be learned might be based on the                    
competence improvement of the skills themselves. In other cases (Figure 1), the sources-component             
and target components are distinct. For example, the hippocampus (or a component of a robot) might                
detect the novelty of some objects and this might drive a motor component to explore them with the                  
function of improving its motor ability to manipulate them. 
 
  
 
Figure 1​: The key components of eIMs. (a) Case where the source-component and target-component 
are the same structure. (b) Case where the  source-component and the target-component are the 
same structure but the retro-action is mediated by an intermediate component; (c) Case where the 
source-component and the target-component are different structures.  
 
 
 
 
IMs that are not eIMs differ from the latter as they do not use a learning source-component as the                   
origin of the motivation, but rather another mechanism: these will be called ​other IMs ​(oIMs) to                
distinguish them from eIMs. Sometimes such “other” mechanism mimics the acquisition of knowledge             
by a possible source-component, but the latter is not actually present. For example, count-based              
novelty mechanisms (Bellemare et al. 2016) perform novelty detection on the basis of the frequency               
with which states are encountered rather than on the basis of how well they are memorized (although                 
it is true that they are still present/absent in the counter memory). In other cases, other mechanisms                 
are used that have the function of acquiring knowledge and skills but do not seem related to                 
knowledge acquisition as a trigger. For example, as discussed in the following sections, the principle               
of ​empowerment ​(Klyubin et al. 2005), or the concept of ​bottlenecks ​(McGovern Barto 2001), can               
support the acquisition of skills but they do not measure the knowledge of a source-component but                
rather some properties of the environment or of the agent’s actions. 
 
A critical difference between EMs and all IMs is the time ​when ​they express their function (utility).                 
EMs tend to express their function at a time very proximal to when they are triggered. This because                  
they lead to accomplish and consume material resources (organisms), or to accomplish the user’s              
goals (robots), and when this happens they manifest their utility. Instead, IMs lead to accomplish               
knowledge and skills that are useful only later with respect to the time when they operate, in particular                  
when such knowledge and skills are used to accomplish material resources or solve user’s goals. This                
point is particularly important as it makes difficult to actually measure the effectiveness of a given IM.                 
A possible way to measure such effectiveness is to divide the life of the agent into two phases                  
(Schembri et al. 2007; Baldassarre et al. 2019): (a) ​Intrinsic motivation phase​: the agent uses IMs to                 
acquire knowledge and skills without a direct utility; (b) ​Extrinsic motivation phase​: the agent uses the                
knowledge and skills acquired in the intrinsic phase to solve extrinsic problems. These two phases               
resemble the two main phases of human life involving a first infancy/childhood phase, mainly guided               
by IMs, and an adulthood phase, mainly guided by EMs (Schembri et al. 2007). The idea of the two                   
phases was also set at the core of the ​REAL competition (Robot open-Ended Autonomous Learning)               1
proposed to create a benchmark for open-ended learning. In this competition, during a first intrinsic               
phase a simulated camera-arm-gripper robot can freely interact with some objects to autonomously             
acquire knowledge and skills without being given any goal or reward; then in a second extrinsic phase                 
the quality of such knowledge and skills is measured by asking the robot to solve some sampled                 
extrinsic tasks involving the re-creation of some sampled object configurations. Two caveats are due              
on this issue. Often in organisms, but also robots, IM and EM operate in parallel, for example a robot                   
might aim to learn how to manipulate an object while accomplishing a user’s task. This requires                
suitable ​arbitration mechanisms ​to mediate between IMs and EMs. Second, IMs and EMs             
mechanisms and functions might be mixed: for example the “source-component + IM-mechanism”            
might support a “target-component” pursuing an extrinsic goal. For example, next sections show a              
common use of novelty-based IMs to improve exploration in the accomplishment of extrinsic RL tasks               
involving “sparse rewards”.  
 
EMs and eIMs (and sometimes also oIMs) also have a typical “temporal signature” (Baldassarre,              
2011). In particular, EMs tend to go away when the resources they are directed to have been                 
obtained, and to come back when the resources are consumed/lost. For example, hunger and the               
reward of food ingestion go away after a sufficient amount of food is ingested, and to come back                  
1 ​https://www.aicrowd.com/challenges/neurips-2019-robot-open-ended-autonomous-learning 
 
 
when, say, the blood glucose level are low again. Instead, eIMs triggered by the acquisition of a                 
particular piece of information stored in the source-component tend to go away for good when such                
piece of information is acquired (unless the information is forgotten). From a biological perspective,              
this helps to recognise if a motivation is an (e)IM or an EM; from a computational perspective it is                   
relevant as it possibly makes problems non-stationary, hence more challenging. 
 
Having drawn the distinction between IMs and EMs, it is also useful to consider some aspects that are                  
not relevant for such distinction. First, IMs should not be confused with motivations related to               
secondary rewards ​studied within psychology (Lieberman 1993). These are initially-neutral stimuli that            
acquire reinforcing properties based on a repeated association with ​primary rewards ​(e.g., a bell ring               
that anticipates several times the delivery of a food to a dog becomes motivating for it). In this respect,                   
both EM and IM generates primary rewards, i.e. rewards that are not related to the association to                 
other rewards but are generated by a primitive mechanisms originating “value” for the organism/robot              
(i.e., they are linked to the acquisition of a material resources, or to the solution of the user’s goal, or                    
to the acquisition of a piece of information). Another irrelevant distinction is between “internal and               
external” elements: both EMs and IMs involve stimuli that are both ​external ​to the agent (e.g., a                 
food/body change, or a novel object) and mechanisms that are ​internal to it and that generate the                 
motivation (Barto et al. 2004), as shown at length below. It is true, however, that IMs are more “inward                   
looking” as they measure knowledge inside the brain/controller whereas EMs measure resources in             
the body or in the environment. 
Three classes of eIMs 
The computational literature has given a strong contribution to distinguish between different classes of              
IM mechanisms. These classes in particular involve eIMs, and often are not applicable to oIMs: here                
the classification refers to IMs ​tout-court ​to stay with the standard nomenclature. A first contribution               
(Oudeyer and Kaplan 2007) distinguishes between ​knowledge-based IMs​, related to the acquisition of             
information on the world, and ​competence-based IMs (CB-IM)​, related to the acquisition of the              
capacity to act effectively. Another contribution (Barto et al. 2013) highlights the need to differentiate               
between two types of knowledge-based IMs, namely novelty-based IMs (NB-IM) and prediction-based            
IMs (PB-IM), often confused within the computational and biological literature. Now the main features              
of the three classes of IMs, summarised in Table 2, are considered more in detail. The classes are                  
based on the function played by the source-component. For each class, there exist many sub-classes               
depending on the functions and mechanisms of the target-components. The IM-mechanism always            
measures the level or change of the knowledge of the source-component.  
 
NB-IMs are based on a ​memory ​source-component that encodes patterns, e.g. percepts, with the              
function of storing and possibly re-coding them in more useful formats, e.g. to compress information               
or to facilitate down-stream processes. The IM-mechanism of NB-IMs performs a measurement of the              
source-component based on a one-step process: this checks the level of ​novelty/familiarity ​of a target               
pattern, e.g. a percept from the world. Another possibility is that the IM-mechanism measures the               
novelty change of the internal representation of the pattern, rather than its level: this can happen if the                  
pattern is experienced multiple times and the source-component improves its representation each            
time. Typical functions played by the target-component, possibly coincident with the           
source-component, involve storing/re-coding of novel items, directing attention to novel items, driving            
their physical exploration, or supporting goal formation. 
 
 
 
PB-IMs are based on a ​predictor ​source-component that predicts patterns on the basis of other               
patterns. In particular, the predictor receives as input a pattern, and possibly the agent’s action, and                
on this basis predicts a target pattern in a future time. The “future time” involves a time range where                   
the target item should happen, but predictions can also be “in space”, as in this example: “given that I                   
see a tree, I predict to see an apple if I look up 15 cm”. The IM-mechanism of PB-IMs performs a                     
measurement of the source-component (predictor) knowledge based on a two-step process: first the             
predictor predicts the target pattern on the basis of an input pattern, and possibly of the agent’s                 
action, and then the mechanism compares the prediction with the target pattern to compute the size of                 
their mismatch - the ​prediction error​. Another possibility is that the measure involves the ​prediction               
error improvement ​(change), rather than the ​prediction error ​(level), based on monitoring how the              
prediction error evolves in time. Typical functions played by the target-component, possibly coincident             
with the source-component, involve improving predictions, directing attention to unpredicted items,           
driving their physical exploration, and forming goals. 
 
Table 2​. The three classes of (e)IMs. Partially based on Barto et al. (2013).  
 Novelty-based IMs Prediction-based IMs Competence-based IMs 
Source-component Memory component 
(pattern magazine) 
Predictor 
(forward model) 
Skill 
(inverse model) 
Function of the 
source-component 
Pattern storing and 
re-coding 
Prediction of patterns 
based on other 
patterns 
Action selection 
Type of knowledge- 
measured by the 
IM-mechanism 
How well-represented 
is the item in memory, 
or how much did its 
representation 
improve? How many 
times has the item 
been observed? 
What is the prediction 
error, or the prediction 
error change? 
How efficient/effective is 
the skill to accomplish the 
task/goal? 
Processes involved 
in the measurement 
of the 
IM-mechanism 
One process: 
memory check 
Two processes: 
(a) prediction; 
(b) comparison of 
prediction with data 
Multiple processes: 
iterated perception- 
action performance, 
check of the success 
Typical functions 
of the 
target-component 
- Store/re-code new  
  items 
- Direct attention 
- Drive physical  
  exploration 
- Support goal  
  formation 
- Improve predictions 
- Drive physical  
  exploration 
- Direct attention 
- Support goal  
  formation 
- Speed up the learning 
of multiple skills 
 
CB-IMs assume the existence of tasks/goals, and are based on a ​skill ​source-component that can               
accomplish the tasks/goals (e.g., within a given period of time, the ​trial​). The skill is a close- or                  
open-loop controller (e.g., a dynamic movement primitive, a policy, or an option) potentially able to               
solve the task/achieve the goal. The IM-mechanism of CB-IMs performs a measurement of the              
knowledge of the source-component that involves a multi-step process: (a) the skill acts to accomplish               
 
 
the task/goal, possibly based on multiple sensorimotor steps; (b) its ​competence level is measured,              
e.g. in terms of the amount of reward collected during the trial, or in terms of goal achievement, or in                    
terms of distance between the achieved state and the goal, etc. Another possibility is that the                
IM-mechanism actually measure the ​competence improvement​, rather than the competence level,           
based on the monitoring of the performance at multiple times. CB-IMs are particularly important in               
cases where ​multiple skills ​for accomplishing different tasks/goals have to be learned. In this respect,               
typical functions played by the sklls (target-component), usually coincident with the           
source-component, is the selection of the skill/goal to learn to speed up the training of all skills/goals. 
 
Note that the definition of CB-IMs assumes the existence of tasks/goals. This is a critical aspect of                 
CB-IMs because open-ended learning agents should be able to autonomously generate or discover             
such tasks/goals as these are a major means to learn skills in an incremental fashion (Mirolli and                 
Baldassarre 2013). Many oIMs considered in the following sections can be used to support such               
self-generation/discovery of tasks/goals. 
Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: behaviour and brain 
This section gives some examples of how IMs, in particular eIMs, are used in brain and behaviour of                  
organisms. Before doing this, however, it gives an example on the brain and behaviour regulates EMs                
in relation to food ingestion as this allows a comparison of the mode of functioning of EMs vs. IMs.                   
This example in particular shows how EMs “measure material resources” while eIMs “measure             
knowledge”. The brain mechanisms supporting EMs are by far evolutionarily more ancient, more             
complex, and more studied than those supporting eIMs. For this reason, IM mechanisms often              
“evolutionary hijacked” existing brain structures emerged to support EM mechanisms. 
Extrinsic motivations 
Animal brain has a complex information exchange not only with muscles and external senses of body                
(in particular hearing and vision) but also with the internal visceral body (Parisi 2004). For example,                
this is particularly apparent for food that is the main source of energy and body components and                 
hence is paramount for survival and reproduction. ​Hypothalamus is a major hub of body homeostatic               
regulations and plays an important role in food intake regulation (Elmquist et al. 2005; Mirolli et al.                 
2010). Visceral body informs the hypothalamus on energy levels via a neural pathway involving the               
nucleus of the solitary tract and the ​parabrachial nucleus​. Hypothalamus itself contains specialized             
glucose-sensitive neurons, is sensitive to the ​leptine hormone which grows when excessive adipose             
tissue in body, and is sensitive to gut hormones. Based on this information, the arcuate nucleus, and                 
other nuclei of the lateral hypothalamus, directly control body metabolism (e.g., the conversion from              
sugar to fat and vice versa) by regulating the autonomic and endocrine systems, and also by                
controlling innate behaviours (e.g., feeding). Hypothalamus also activates, both directly and indirectly            
via the ​peduncolopontine nucleus​, the ​ventral tegmental area ​producing ​dopamine ​(Geisler et al.,             
2007). Dopamine (Shultz 2002), especially when phasic (i.e. represented by a short intense activation              
of dopamine neurons) is one of the most important neuromodulators involved causing learning             
processes in ​basal ganglia and motor areas of the ​frontal cortex, the brain system underlying               
trial-and-error learning processes corresponding to RL.  
 
There is a wide literature on the role of phasic dopamine for the learning of behaviour (for a review                   
from a computational perspective, see Sutton and Barto 2018), fueled by one of the most fertile                
 
 
collaborations between neuroscience and and modelling of brain and behaviour in particular based on              
RL models. The key ideas of this link are captured by the ​actor-critic ​RL model (Barto 1995). This                  
model is based on two components. The first component is the ​actor ​that learns to produce                
stimulus-response associations (​policy​). The second component is the ​critic ​that learns to predict             
future rewards and on this basis produces a step-by-step reward prediction error. This error, called               
temporal difference error ​(​TD-error​), indicates how much the actor performed better or worse than              
average in the last visited state. It is proposed that the actor and critic processes might actually be                  
implemented in the brain, in particular the actor might correspond to a part of the basal ganglia called                  
striosomes​, the critic might correspond to another part of the basal-ganglia called ​matriosomes​, and              
the TD-error might correspond to phasic dopamine signals (Houk and Barto 1995).  
 
Aside the sensors detecting “material resources” ​inside the body, organisms often possess other             
sensors located ​on the surface of the body to detect the availability of resources in the reachable                 
surrounding space. Smell and taste are examples of these sensors. These sensors are activated not               
only just before food is ingested, but also in anticipation of such an event, for example by the odours                   
released by food in the air (reptiles “taste” odours in the air through typical tongue rhythmic                
movements). Also these sensors send information to brain centres involved in producing primary             
learning signals (Kandel et al. 2000). Based on this information, the brain also learns to detect the                 
presence of resources in the environment through other distal sensors, for example hearing and              
vision. These processes, producing secondary learning signals, rely on the associative processes of             
amygdala representing an important brain hub for EMs (Mirolli et al. 2010).  
Intrinsic motivations 
This section considers some biological systems that can be considered specific instances of the three               
classes of IM systems presented in the previous section. It also briefly mentions some models               
proposed to study such systems. 
  
An important example of NB-IMs pivots on the ​hippocampus​, a phylogenetically ancient cortex that              
plays a crucial role in the acquisition and consolidation of memories thanks to its widespread               
connections to most neocortex. The hippocampus is part of a brain system (Lisman and Grace 2005)                
that nicely reflects the organisation of such type of IMs. The hippocampus is highly activated by the                 
perception of unfamiliar items, in particular novel objects or novel spatial arrangements of familiar              
objects (Kumaran, 2007). When it detects novel stimuli/configurations, the hippocampus activates the            
dopaminergic neurons of the ​ventral tegmental area that send dopamine to the hippocampus itself,              
and this favours the formation of memories of the new items. In this case, the source-component is                 
the hippocampus, storing memories of precepts. The IM-mechanism is internal to the hippocampus,             
proposed to highly respond to novel stimuli as it compares stimuli with existing memories              
(“comparator hypothesis”), and on this basis to trigger dopamine production. The target-component is             
the hippocampus itself where the formation of the memory of new stimuli is facilitated by dopamine. A                 
second example of NB-IM is related to another neuromodulator, ​noradrenaline​, produced by the ​locus              
coeruleus ​in the brainstem. In rats, locus coeruleus activates in correspondence to novel stimuli and               
objects encountered during free exploration and then habituates after few experiences (Sara 1994),             
thus possibly influencing learning processes in cortical areas targeted by noradrenaline. The following             
section will discuss various machine learning models pivoting on mechanisms for novelty detection. 
 
 
 
The most theoretically articulated and empirically supported theory on PB-IM is related to ​superior              
colliculus and phasic dopamine (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). The theory proposes that ​unexpected             
events​, e.g. changes of the environment caused by actions, activate the superior colliculus, an area of                
the midbrain that receives input from the retina and plays a key role in saccade generation. The                 
superior colliculus causes phasic dopamine bursts of the ​substantia nigra compacta and the produced              
dopamine reaches basal ganglia few milliseconds after the stimulus. Here the dopamine signal             
causes the association between the sensations preceding the action and the performed action that              
possibly caused the stimulus. This process allows the organism to refine the action causing the effect.                
With repeated experiences, the superior colliculus response is progressively inhibited. After being            
formed, the skill can be recalled for execution if its outcome becomes desirable (e.g., on the basis of                  
extrinsic motivations). Here the source-component is the neural system formed by the superior             
colliculus bursting to changes, and the syb-system that allows the anticipation and progressive             
inhibition of the superior colliculus, which has not yet been clearly identified (a hypothesis involves the                
basal ganglia themselves); the IM-mechanism is the stimulus prediction error causing the dopamine             
burst; and the target-component are the basal ganglia learning the skill.  
 
Marraffa et al. (2012) proposed a model that captures some key elements of the latter system                
proposing a camera robot that learns to look the stimuli on a screen as in a target empirical                  
experiment with babies (Want et al. 2012). The model self-generates a reward signal, similar to what                
would be done by the superior colliculus, when a new image suddenly appears at the centre of the                  
screen as an effect of the fact that the system looks a certain target stimulus. This allows the model to                    
learn the skill to visually navigate the screen to reliably cause the appearance of the image. Based on                  
these processes, the model succeed to reproduce some of the effects found in the target experiment,                
for example the fact that after some time the children start to produce anticipatory saccades to the                 
location where the image will appear. 
 
There is not a complete example for CB-IM, but empirical evidence suggests some elements that               
might help to build such an example. The previous section has reviewed the brain machinery pivoting                
on basal ganglia and the dopamine system, studied with actor-critic models, that allows the              
acquisition of skills based on extrinsic rewards. If one assumes that the brain is able to autonomously                 
produce ​intrinsic rewards from ​self-generated tasks and goals (discussed below), and to associate to              
their accomplishment an ​intrinsic reward​, the rest of the machinery needed to implement a whole               
CB-IM system might be formed by the brain elements implementing the actor-critic functions. Indeed,              
as we have seen, the TD-error of the critic measures the fact the actor selected an action                 
“better/worse than usual”, so it can be seen as the IM-mechanism measuring the competence              
improvement of the actor (the source-component) used to train the actor itself to acquire the skill                
(target-component). It has been shown that indeed some brain areas of prefrontal cortex respond to               
the successful achievement of subgoals in extrinsic tasks and generate the production of a              
dopaminergic reward signal (Ribas-Fernades et al. 2011). So it might be hypothesised that also the               
accomplishment of intrinsic tasks/goals generates (intrinsic) rewards, and these might allow the            
actor-critic brain machinery to acquire the skills needed for such accomplishment. 
 
The computational viability of such hypothesis has been shown with a model (Baldassarre et al.,               
2013) that reproduces the main structures of basal ganglia and cortex involved in the (self-)generation               
and encoding of goals, and the learning of the skills to accomplish them, driven by intrinsic rewards.                 
The model allows an abstract agent to select actions to explore a “mechatronic board” having buttons                
that if touched produce different effects such as the opening of some boxes. Other models (Fiore et                 
 
 
al. 2014; Mannella et al., 2016) show how IMs and EMs can largely rely on the same brain machinery.                   
In particular, Fiore et al. (2014) shows how the same scenario of the mechatronic board, this time                 
involving extrinsic rewards, is faced on the basis of the same brain skill learning machinery as in                 
Baldassarre et al. (2013), but this time the primary and secondary rewards are managed by amygdala                
(Mannella et al. 2016; Mirolli et al. 2010).  
Cognitive robotics and machine learning models 
This section considers the main functions that can be supported by IMs through the presentation of                
some computational models drawn from the robotics and machine learning literature. The section in              
particular focuses on how IMs serve the acquisition of the overall capacity of agents to interact in the                  
world to modify it (Mirolli and Baldassarre 2013). This focus leads to consider in particular the relation                 
between IMs and RL, the learning paradigm most closely related to the acquisition of the capacity to                 
act in the world. Given this focus, the IM functions considered here are these (Figure 2): (a) the                  
accomplishment of sparse extrinsic rewards; (b) the self-generation of goals; (c) the acquisition of              
skills, either as policies per se or as policies linked to goals. These functions are in particular                 
accomplished through processes that strongly rely on IM mechanisms alongside other mechanisms;            
these latter processes are (a) exploration; (b) goal sampling, imagination, or “marking”; (c) and the               
autonomous selection of skills to learn. The model examples refer not only to robots but also to                 
embodied agents acting in simulated scenarios as the proposed mechanisms might also be employed              
in robots. 
 
 
Figure 2​: Some important functions that can be accomplished through some processes that strongly 
rely on IM mechanisms (with the exception of evolution). 
 
The first main function of IMs is to support the solution of RL tasks involving ​sparse ​extrinsic rewards,                  
i.e. rewards that are encountered rarely if the agent explores the environment randomly. Sparse              
rewards challenge learning agents as they can be experienced only after the performance of a long                
sequence of actions and so they furnish a very weak guidance for training. For example, imagine a                 
camera-arm robot with no initial motor skills getting rewarded only for succeeding to grasp and lift an                 
object with random movements: in this case, it is almost impossible that a random exploration leads to                 
 
 
get the reward and support learning. IMs can be very useful to solve tasks involving sparse rewards                 
as they can enhance the ​exploration of the environment through which the agent searches the               
reward. Standard exploration methods, such as the ​ε-greedy exploration (the agent selects a random              
action with a probability ​ε, ​and the best policy otherwise) and the ​Boltzmann-distribution exploration              
(the possible actions are selected on the basis of a ​soft-max function of their expected reward                
returns), are not adequate to face sparse-reward tasks. Various approaches have hence been             
proposed to produce a more effective exploration of the environment. A popular approach to foster               
exploration is based on NB-IMs. The idea is that the agent is attracted by states that it visited a few                    
times and tends to move away from familiar states. An extra-reward (​novelty bonus​) could be given to                 
the agent for making novel states attractive (Brafman and Tennenholtz 2002; Kakade and Dayan              
2002). A nice property of novelty bonuses, and in general of IMs used to foster the pursuit of extrinsic                   
rewards, is that since IMs have a transient nature they tend to not affect the final policy acquired to                   
maximise the final extrinsic reward. 
 
A relevant class of methods using novelty to foster exploration in the search of extrinsic rewards are                 
based on state novelty measured as number of times that a state is encountered (Bellemare et al.                 
2016). In particular, these methods use density models to compute a pseudo-count of the times in                
which states are visited, based on the generalisation of the counts for similar states. The method was                 
successfully applied to control agents able to solve the Atari game Montezuma Revenge involving a               
highly sparse reward. Another example is presented in Burda et al. (2018), using a different               
mechanism to compute the novelty of states. Here a random network is used to re-code the state                 
observations (images), and a second “copy” network is trained with supervised learning to mimic such               
network (same input; desired output as the random network). The idea here is that when states                
become more familiar the error of the copy network decreases. The model is used to improve                
performance with Atari games, especially those involving sparse rewards. 
 
Exploration to pursue extrinsic goals could be also pursued through PB-IMs. PB-IMs can rely on the                
prediction error (Schmidhuber 1991), or the ​prediction error improvement (Schmidhuber 1991a), of a             
predictor network (i.e. a world model predicting the next state on the basis of the current state and                  
possibly the planned action). The prediction error has the disadvantage, if used by a IM-mechanism,               
that it does not fade away in stochastic words. This problem is solved by the prediction error                 
improvement, although at the cost of having a noisy and slow-adjusting signal. In the initial models                
using this strategy, the predictor was used both as the source-component and as the              
target-component, meaning that the function of the used IM was to train the predictor itself. The same                 
IM mechanism can however be also used to foster exploration to accomplish extrinsic tasks involving               
sparse rewards. An example of model doing this is presented in Pathack et al. (2017). Here a forward                  
model is used to produce a prediction error used as intrinsic reward to train a RL agent to solve video                    
games such as Mario Bross involving sparse extrinsic rewards. Interestingly, here the forward model              
does not take as input the observations of states but rather their encoding obtained by training an                 
inverse model that gets as input a pair of succeeding states and learns to predict as output the action                   
causing the transition between the pair. The encoding of the states is given by the intermediate layers                 
of the network implementing the inverse model trained in a supervised fashion. The attempt of the                
inverse model to predict the action leads it to form encodings of states that have features that only                  
covariate with the features of the world states that are affected by the agent’s action, rather than with                  
irrelevant state features not caused by the agent’s action. 
 
 
 
A very interesting function for which IMs can be used is related to the acquisition of multiple                 
sensorimotor skills that might be later used to accomplish other intrinsic tasks, or extrinsic tasks, in                
particular within a hierarchical RL framework where behaviour is chunked into ​options (Sutton et al.               
1999). Here we consider the goal-based version of options where each option involves (Barto et al.                
2004, Singh et al. 2005): (a) a termination condition associated with the accomplishment of a ​goal​; (b)                 
an action policy indicating the primitive actions to select in correspondence to different states of the                
world; (c) (possibly) an initiation set encompassing the states from which if executed the policy is able                 
to accomplish the goal. A goal is a representation of a set of world states that, if re-activated                  
internally, drives the agent to act in the world so that the world assumes one of those states. There                   
are various types of goals, for example goals as states of the world, goals as trajectories of states,                  
avoidance goals, maintenance goals, etc. (Merrick et al. 2016). Here the focus is only on goals as                 
states as this is the most important type of goals, but many considerations presented here could be                 
extended to other types of goals. Goals can have different levels of abstraction and can involve own                 
body (Mannella et al. 2018, Hoffmann et al. 2010) or the external environment (e.g., Santucci et al.                 
2016), or their relation (Kulkarni et al. 2016), possibly also involving social aspects (Acevedo-Valle et               
al. 2018). 
 
There are multiple functions, supported by IMs, that are important for learning repertoires of multiple               
skills. These functions are all related to the fact that, during intrinsic autonomous learning,              
open-ended learning agents should learn as many skills as possible, and as well as possible, so that                 
they can later best solve extrinsic tasks/goals. Here four of those functions are considered: (a) the                
autonomous generation of goals; (b) the coverage of the widest possible part of the goal space (​goal                 
exploration​); (c) the generation of the reward for learning the policy of the single option; (d) the                 
support of the progressive learning of skills, from easy to difficult, so to speed-up their acquisition. 
 
The function of goal formation is related to the fact that during the intrinsic phase open-ended learning                 
agents are not given any task to solve and so they should autonomously self-generate tasks/goals               
guiding the acquisition of the related skills. Note that although goal-formation is extremely important              
for open-ended learning, and various methods supporting it involve eIMs (Mirolli and Baldassarre             
2013), it often also involves other mechanisms different from the elements of eIMsl             
(source-component, IM-mechanism, and target-component). These additional mechanisms are here         
considered to belong to oIMs: further investigations are needed to understand if these have common               
underlying factors and if and how they are related to eIMs. Various methods have been proposed to                 
support the autonomous generation of goals and some relevant ones are now considered.  
 
Goal formation by sampling. When the goal-space is given, e.g. it is formed by the posture angles of a                   
robot or the x-y positions of an object on a table, goals can be sampled on the basis of their                    
skill-learnability. For example, ​goal babbling ​(Rolf et al. 2005) allows a robot to self-generate posture               
goals that facilitate the learning of a coherent inverse model by maximising the end-effector              
displacement, which favours the exploration of novel goals, while minimising the posture change,             
which favours the learning of regular vs. awkward postures among the many possible (redundant)              
postures. The approach has been later extended in various directions, for example to learn multiple               
models in parallel (from end-effector position space to joint space, and from the joint space to the                 
motor space) on the basis of an associative radial basis function network incrementally expanded on               
the basis of novel experiences (Rayyes and Steil 2019).  
 
 
 
The goal-space might not be given to the agent, but form a subspace of the state- or                 
observation-space to be actively searched. In this case goal sampling is not possible, especially if the                
subspace is small with respect to the whole space, and so the agent has to actively discovered by the                   
agent. Consider for example an observation space formed by images: in this case, the agent has to                 
actively discover the image goals that it might actually achieve with its actions within the whole huge                 
space formed by all possible images corresponding to all combinations of the pixel values. Now some                
approaches usable for that purpose are considered. 
 
Mechanisms for goal marking​. A number of models have proposed specific mechanisms to “mark”, i.e.               
recognise as goals, experienced states or observations. These models do not have the features of               
eIMs but can support open-ended learning via the formation of goals and the learning of the related                 
skills, so they can be considered as oIMs. A classic approach is the one for marking as goals the                   
experienced states of the world that represent ​bottlenecks ​(McGovern and Barto 2001), i.e. nodal              
conditions that are often traversed when solving multiple extrinsic tasks (e.g., doorways when             
navigating a house). Another model proposed to form goals corresponding to ​salient events​, for              
example a change of light or sound (Barto et al. 2004; Singh et al. 2005). Another set of models used                    
a strategy to mark as goals the observations that follow the production of ​novel ​changes caused by                 
the agent’s actions ​in the environment (Santucci et al. 2016; Mannella et al. 2018). The idea behind                 
this approach is that what robots (and organisms) ultimately should do during intrinsic learning is to                
become able to change the world at will, so the observations that follow a change caused by their                  
actions indicates a potential for doing this. The novelty of the changes guarantees that the goal has                 
not been already formed. If changes in the world can happen also independently of the agent’s action,                 
additional mechanisms are needed to allow the agent to identify those changes that depend on its                
action (Sperati and Baldassarre 2018). Another approach forms goals when a particular relation             
between couples of elements takes place, e.g. the agent picks up a key in an Atari game (Kulkarni et                   
al. 2016). A different approach (Zhao et al. 2012) proposes a motorised looking camera to use RL to                  
acquire various behaviours in the field of active vision (Ballard 1991; Ognibene and Baldassarre              
2015), such as vergence control, by using as reward the ​accuracy of the reconstruction ​of images of a                  
sparse-coding component (Olshausen and Field 1996). Here the model seems to have one             
source-component (the sparse-coding component) but a double function (two target-components),          
one directed to acquire useful behaviours (RL component), as vergence control, and another directed              
to favour the acquisition of good internal representations of percepts (two target-components).            
Another interesting approach is ​empowerment ​(Klyubin et al. 2005), based on information theory, that              
can be used to assign to each given world state a value that represents the variety of different                  
outcome states that the agent can achieve with its actions from the given state. States with high                 
empowerment can be used as target states, in particular their empowerment value can be directly               
used as reward to drive the learning of skills in the absence of tasks and extrinsic rewards (Jung et al.                    
2011). The overall concept of empowerment has a scope and relevance for open-ended learning that               
is broader than the one discussed here, but discussing this would go beyond the scope of this                 
contribution. Der and Martius (2015) propose another approach that uses emergent properties of the              
environment-body-controller dynamics to acquire interesting motor skills without the use of extrinsic            
rewards. The skills are in particular acquired on the basis of a simple two-layer neural-network               
sensorimotor controller whose connection weights are trained through a ​Differential Extrinsic Plasticity            
(DEP) rule that is derived from ​Differential Hebbian Learning (Zappacosta et al. 2018), which updates               
connection weights if the pre-synaptic neuron changes correlate with the post-synaptic neuron            
changes, but is also sensitive to physical changes affecting the neurons and caused by the               
environment. 
 
 
 
Goal discovery by exploration​. Another strategy searches goals based on the idea that similar goals               
involve similar skills, and so the performance of noisy variants of the already discovered skills might                
possibly lead to new viable goals. This strategy was first used in a model (​skill babbling​; Reinhart                 
2017) to control an arm robot learning to displace an object in the 3D space. The model forms clusters                   
of similar goals and discovers new goals by performing noisy versions of the skills corresponding to                
the centroid goals of the clusters, in particular focussing on the most recent clusters. The ​active goal                 
manifold exploration ​model (AGME; Cartoni and Baldassarre, 2018) goes beyond the discretisation of             
the goal-space in clusters by actively constructing a homogeneous representation of the goal manifold              
hidden in the observation space (from posture angles to image pixels). To this purpose, the model                
builds a distance-based graph of the discovered goals, selects goals that have a higher average               
distance from other discovered goals, generates perturbed versions of the policies associated with             
such goals, and performs them so possibly discovering new goals. Another model (the ​quality              
diversity algorithm​, Kim et al. 2019) learns a repertoire of behaviours and goals by searching               
behaviours that are different (novel) with respect to the already learned behaviours. The algorithm is               
for example used to allow a humanoid robot to acquire the skills to throw a ball into a basket located                    
in many possible different positions (goals) on the floor. Another approach, called Hindsight             
Experience Replay (​HER​; Adrychowicz et al. 2017), exploits the unexpected outcome of policies to              
discover new goals (“unexpected” as different from the pursued goal). The approach is shown to be                
very effective to incrementally discover new goals, e.g. for the manipulation of objects in a simulated                
camera-arm-gripper robot. 
 
Goal formation by imagination​. Another related strategy tries to discover goals by first imagining them               
and then by pursuing them in the environment to check for their existence (or to discover similar                 
goals). For example, the ​reinforcement learning with imagined goals ​model (RIG; Nair et al, 2018),               
tested with a robot arm moving objects on a table, uses a generative model (a variational                
autoencoder; Kingma and Welling 2013) to first learn an internal compact representation of goals by               
randomly exploring the environment, and then to “imagine” other possible goals whose skills are              
learned by RL. A later version of the model generates goals that have a high probability of being novel                   
with respect to already learned goals by sampling them on the fringe of the distribution of the internal                  
representation of the discovered goals (Pong et al. 2019). Incidentally, imagination is a relevant              
means not only to generate goals but also to formulate plans to achieve those goals by assembling                 
other goals/skills (Seepanomwan et al. 2015, Hung et al. 2018, Jung et al. 2019, Tanneberg et al.                 
2019) possibly acquired with IMs: this is an interesting recent trend that aims to re-formulate some of                 
the concepts relevant for higher level cognition elaborated by the classic symbolic planning literature              
(Russell and Norvig 2016), such as goals and planning, through neural-network representations            
(Baldassarre et al. 2001; Wayne et al. 2018).  
 
Selection of the skills/goals to train​. The literature on animal learning (Skinner 1953) and on staged                
children development (Piaget 1953) shows that learning progress is faster if it proceeds from easy to                
difficult tasks. This strategy can also be used with artificial systems by training them with a ​curriculum                 
involving increasingly difficult tasks (Asada et al. 1996; Bengio et al. 2009). One of the most                
interesting uses of IMs allows open-ended learning agents to ​autonomously select increasingly            
difficult tasks to learn, in particular tasks posing the challenges suitable for the current learner’s               
knowledge. These processes can be used for learning sets of given tasks or tasks autonomously               
generated through the algorithms seen above. Initially, PB-IMs were used to support the autonomous              
selection of tasks to learn (e.g. Singh et al. 2004; Oudeyer et al., 2007). Here the source-component                 
 
 
was a predictor while the target-component was the skill to be trained. The agent in particular                
focussed its learning on skills causing the highest predictor error, or prediction error improvement,              
related to the prediction of the skill outcome. Successively, CB-IMs were shown to be more               
appropriate than PB-IMs for selecting the skills to train because the predictor of the PB-IMs might                
learn to predict the skill outcome too early or too late with respect to when the controller finishes to                   
learn the skill; instead, CB-IMs directly measure the competence acquired by the different skills and               
so it returns a better information to select them (Santucci et al. 2013 compared these different IM                 
mechanisms for task selection). CB-IMs can also be used when the conditions from which to               
accomplish the tasks are variable, a situation implying the additional challenge that competence             
differs for the different conditions; or when the agent might decide to select a skill, notwithstanding it is                  
already well trained, to accomplish its goal when this is also a precondition for learning other skills                 
(Santucci et al. 2019). IMs can also guide the progressive learning of increasingly difficult tasks               
represented at multiple levels of abstraction, e.g. in robots learning to interact with different objects               
(Ugur and Piater 2016). In all these models, and contrary to what was done in early models using                  
PB-IMs, the selected skills are trained with RL through a ​pseudo-reward ​equal to one when the goal is                  
accomplished and to zero otherwise: this is a clearer signal to use for this purpose as IM signals fade                   
away with learning. 
 
Evolution​. Tasks/goals could be also generated autonomously through evolutionary algorithms that           
search for them on the basis of an objective function (fitness) based on the success in solving                 
extrinsic tasks through the skills learned on the basis of the self-generated tasks/goals. Schembri et               
al. (2007) proposed a first model to do so in a population of RL simulated robots that in a first                    
“childhood phase” used evolved intrinsic reward functions to learn skills. In a later “adulthood phase”               
the robots learned to compose the acquired skills to accomplish extrinsic tasks, requiring to follow               
coloured paths on the floor: these extrinsic tasks produced the fitness for the genetic algorithm. Singh                
et al. (2010) used an algorithm equivalent to evolution to search reward functions of RL agents                
engaged in searching for food in a grid word. The found reward functions with the highest score led                  
the agents to be rewarded not only for searching for food but also for “opening boxes” where food was                   
hidden. The model was used to argue the existence of a continuum between EMs and IMs, rather                 
than a distinction between them, as the two differ only for their distance from the final extrinsic reward.                  
The view proposed here on eIMs should clearly distinguish them from EMs as eIMs are based on an                  
IM-mechanism that measures the ​knowledge ​of a component of the controller whereas EMs are              
based on the measure of ​material resources in the body or in the environment. It is however true that                   
in the case of evolved oIMs that support the formation of goals and skills, as in the models above, a                    
continuum with EMs can be seen since the criterion of the knowledge-measurement mechanism of              
eIMs is missing. An additional crucial problem for open-ended learning that can be tackled with               
evolutionary approaches is the following one: which goals/skills should be acquired, among the             
possible ones, to later best solve several different extrinsic tasks in a given domain? This problem                
was faced in Del Verme et al. (2019) that used a genetic algorithm to search goals/skills that were                  
optimal for the solution of tasks drawn from a certain distribution of possible tasks in a given domain.                  
The work showed how the optimal goals and skills depended on the time budget that the agent had in                   
order to solve the extrinsic tasks and on the physical regularities of the environment, thus showing                
that “fixed” mechanisms for goal generation as those seen above might lead to suboptimal solutions.               
Importantly, evolutionary approaches might also be used to evolve the IM-mechanisms altogether, as             
hinted by the arrows in Figure 2 departing from the “evolution box” (Salgado et al. 2016). A problem                  
with this objective is that it is computationally very expensive. 
 
 
Conclusion and open challenges 
This section closes the paper by illustrating some of the open issues of open-ended learning and                
intrinsic motivations. Some of the open issues involve neuroscience and psychology. A first important              
objective, shared with other topics of investigation, would be to more often formalise theories on brain                
and behaviour as computational models rather than only as verbal models (Naselaris et al. 2018).               
This would have the advantages of specifying theories, of producing quantitative predictions testable             
in empirical experiments, and of favouring the progressive integration of psychological/neuroscientific           
knowledge now scattered in multiple parts related to different experimental paradigms and topics. For              
example, one might investigate the biological and behavioural basis of the distinction between novelty              
and surprise intrinsic motivations, which have been distinguished within the computational literature            
but are still confused within the empirical research (Barto et al. 2013). An important overall challenge                
related to the study of intrinsic motivations is that these are elicited only when the experimental                
conditions pose challenges that are not too easy nor too difficult for the participant, and this strongly                 
depends on the specific experiences of each different participant. One way to face this problem is to                 
create unusual experimental conditions that one is sure are novel for all participants and so will be                 
engaging for all of them (Taffoni et al. 2014), but the challenge of tuning the right level of challenge for                    
all participants still remains. Another challenge involves autonomous goal generation processes. We            
have seen that these processes are pivotal for open-ended learning. This topic, with few exceptions               
(e.g. Ribas-Fernandes et al. 2011), is now largely neglected by neuroscience and psychology             
notwithstanding its dramatic importance. A reason is probably the difficulty of its study as it does not                 
allow the exploitation of the usual empirical paradigms based on extrinsic tasks that facilitate having               
tight controlled empirical conditions. Another related hard obstacle is the difficulty of empirically             
measuring and manipulating the goals of participants since goals are a very complex construct              
(“internal representations that, if activated internally, drive behaviour and learning”). One way to             
manipulate goals is for example the ​devaluation paradigm (Kenward 2009; Mannella et al. 2016): this               
gives an idea of the level of complexity of the experimental paradigms needed to manipulate goals. A                 
construct related to goals that is easier to study than them is represented by ​sensorimotor               
contingencies (Jacquey et al. 2019; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al. 2014), but these do not fully capture                 
the richness and cognitive importance of goals. Notwithstanding these and other difficulties the             
empirical study of intrinsic motivations and of the autonomous formation of goals is strongly needed               
as these processes are at the basis of humans’ curiosity, creativity, science, and art, and also crucial                 
for human well-being (Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
 
On the computational side, the problem of open-ended learning is still unsolved as shown by the fact                 
that we still do not have robots able to undergo a truly open-ended learning experience leading to an                  
unbounded accumulation of knowledge and skills. This might depend on multiple factors. On the side               
of goal formation, we have various mechanisms for the autonomous generation of goals, but none of                
them has so far revealed as resolutive. Future work should hence aim to further develop the different                 
approaches, and also to evaluate which ones can scale up to support the acquisition of increasingly                
complex skills. Indeed, all known approaches have limitations: goal sampling (e.g. Rolf et al. 2005)               
can only be applied when the goal space is known; goal formation based on mechanisms such as                 
bottlenecks (e.g. McGovern and Barto 2001), novel environment changes caused by actions (e.g.             
Santucci et al. 2016), empowerment (Klyubin et al. 2005), and Differential Extrinsic Plasticity (Der and               
Martius 2015), have to be tested for their applicability to a wider range of domains; goal exploration                 
(e.g. Reinhart 2018; Cartoni and Baldassarre, 2018), and goal discovery by imagination (e.g. Pong et               
 
 
al. 2019) have still to show that they can scale up larger sets goals. Alternatively, new approaches                 
might be proposed, also possibly based on the integration of previous approaches. The autonomous              
selection of the skills to train, based on competence-based intrinsic motivations (e.g. Santucci et al.               
2016) is reliable but assumes discrete goals which require the development of suitable solutions to be                
applied to continuous goal spaces. Moreover, systems working with discrete goals solve extrinsic             
problems based on planning/search methods (e.g. Baldassarre et al. 2018) which require that the              
number of learned goal/skills is limited to be efficient. This problem might be faced with evolutionary                
methods that search few efficient skills that lead to the optimal solution of multiple tasks drawn from                 
the possible ones in a certain domain (e.g. Schembri et al. 2007; Singh et al. 2010; Del Verme et al.                    
2019). However, the computational burden of these approaches is so high that they are still only                
applicable to simple domains given the computational power of current computers. 
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